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On 13 May 1985, police in Philadelphia acted against the MOVE organisation, a group of mostly black activists espousing a mixed philosophy of communal living, vegetarianism, animal rights and black liberation. During the police action a stand-off ensued at the property that was the MOVE's home and headquarters. Water was first poured into the house to 'flush out' the residents and shots were then fired, with the police using semi-automatic weapons. After 90 minutes of shooting, the police action shifted: they bombed the property. In this exercise of state power, six adults and five children were burned alive. The bombing also had the effect of burning down some 60 houses in the block; eyewitnesses described the whole area as looking like a war zone. An official commission established by the Mayor to investigate what happened issued a Report the following year. Although it found that the bombing was 'unconscionable', no criminal charges were brought against the state or police: unconscionable it may have been, but it could not officially be considered a crime. Yet if it was not a crime, what kind of act was it?
The image on the cover of this book is based on the police bombing in Philadelphia and was created by elin o'Hara slavick. I am grateful to elin for permission to use the image.
I am also grateful to: Tyler Wall for his persistence in sending me snippets of information on matters pertaining to air power, his willingness to share his extensive knowledge of drones, and his general support for the project that this book has become; George Rigakos and other colleagues in the anti-security collective for pursuing the arguments regarding pacification -'the book' on pacification has yet to be written, but that project seeps into this book here and there; my colleagues on the Radical Philosophy Editorial Collective for allowing me to test the vii viii argument out at various points; Susan Marks, Maia Pal and Hayley Gibson for comments on the argument concerning international law; Yari Lanci, Caroline Holmqvist, Colleen Bell and Jan Bachmann for opportunities to pursue the argument about air power, and Michael D. Smith for in turn pushing that line of enquiry; James Brassett and Nick Vaughan-Williams for the initial chance to open the question of trauma and resilience.
Several people were unstinting in offering time, space and hospitality well beyond what is regarded as the norm in academic circles. Matthew Hughes offered countless sources and resources from inside the world of military history as well as more general support as a good friend and colleague; Rob Crawford allowed me to test three different aspects of the argument in the book across two days at the University of Washington; during a trip to the University of Winnipeg Steven Kohm, Heidi Rimke and George Rigakos helped me exercise what some might call my 'resilience' but what I prefer to think of as revolutionary will; Oktay Dursun, Deniz Özçetin, Burak Özçetin and Dinçer Demirkent enabled me to communicate in and through three days in Ankara; Valerie Kerruish at the ASFPG in Hamburg twice offered time and space to pursue parts of the argument, and occasionally saw through the magic. For seeing through the whole thing I am, as ever, heavily in debt to DB,
INTRODUCTION
For the War Machine rolls on, never stopping, never resting, never sleeping, on and on, always rising, always consuming, always devouring. On and on, the War Machine rolls on, across the fields and through the forests, on and on, over looted house and over stripped corpse, on and on, and from severed hand into bloody hands, forever-bloody hands, money passes, money changes, money grows.
David Peace, Occupied City (2009) In 2005 yet another book was published on that perennial theme loved by military theorists, strategic thinkers and IR scholars: 'the art of war'. Called The Utility of Force: The Art of War in the Modern World, the book was written by a British General with 40 years' experience in the British army and as NATO Supreme Commander, and was published as a cheap paperback to reach a wide audience. It begins with a stark statement: 'war no longer exists'. Conflict, confrontation and combat continue, but 'the entire concept of war … has changed'. 1 It sounds like a provocation, a neat rhetorical device with which to open a book on war, until one realises that the author is far from alone in making such a claim. A report on the lessons of the Kosovo campaign published by the Centre for Strategic and International Studies in Washington claims that 'it may be that one of the lessons of modern war is that war can no longer be called war'.
2 Likewise, when asked in an interview in 2010 whether the war in Iraq was effectively over, one US General who had worked as Senior Serving Officer in Iraq for four years replied: 'War is a very different concept. This is a -I call it more of an operation, not a war.' the fore, and then sometimes just as quickly disappeared, to discuss military conflict and politically organised violence: 'persistent conflict', 'quasi-war', 'pseudo war', 'measures short of war', 'counterinsurgency', 'civic action', 'grey area operations', 'reprisals', 'state of belligerency', 'state of hostilities', 'asymmetrical war', 'effects-based operations' and 'military operations other than war'. War, it seems, can take many forms, but rarely now does it get given the simple label 'war'. On this basis it is not surprising that commentators have noted that almost anything can be called 'war' except the actions that used to be called 'war'. 4 So even if it has not quite 'ceased to exist', 5 war appears to have at least 'lost its welldefined contours'.
6 War, it seems, is 'in crisis '. 7 This crisis has had an impact on the ways in which critical thinkers talk about war, for a new consensus seems to have emerged concerning a supposed continuity between the conditions of war and peace. Alain Badiou, for example, suggests that the category 'war' has become so obscured that it 'has rendered war and peace indistinguishable'. 'In the end', notes Badiou, contemporary wars 'are not really distinguishable from the continuity of "peace"'. Antonio Negri and Eric Alliez likewise comment that 'peace appears to be merely the continuation of war by other means', adding that because peace, 'otherwise known as global war … is a permanent state of exception', war now 'presents itself as peace-keeping' and has thereby reversed their classical relationship.
8
Their reference to a concept made popular following Giorgio Agamben's State of Exception is far from unusual in this new consensus since, according to Agamben, in the state of exception the distinction between war and peace becomes impossible. 9 Likewise, according to Slavoj Žižek, in 'the new wars … it will not even be clear whether it is a war or not. Somehow life will go on and we will learn that we are at war, as we are now'.
10 'We no longer have wars in the old sense of a regulated conflict between sovereign states' but, rather, either 'struggles between groups of Homo sacer … which violate the rules of universal human rights, do not count as wars proper, and call for "humanitarian pacifist" intervention by Western powers' or 'direct attacks on the USA or other representatives of the new global order, in which case, again, we do not have wars proper, merely "unlawful combatants" criminally resisting the forces of universal order'. Hence 'the old Orwellian motto "War is Peace" finally becomes reality'.
11
For a sense of how wide this consensus now is one need only cite a few more examples from a diverse range of publications: Ulrich Beck claims that 'the differences between war and peace, the military and police, war and crime … are from within and without, completely annulled'; Daniel Ross argues that an analysis of democratic violence shows that 'peacetime and wartime … are increasingly convergent'; Rey Chow suggests that war is now the very definition of normality itself; Gopal Balakrishnan claims that the invasion and policing of 'rogue states' means that 'a long-term epistemic shift seems to be occurring which is blurring older distinctions between war and peace'; and François Debrix argues that the reason the war machine permeates everyday culture is because the distinction between peace and war has broken down.
12 At the same time, leading peace thinkers claim that the concept of peace is also in crisis.
13
I have no interest in challenging this account about the convergence of war and peace in itself; as will be seen, despite its apparent boldness it is in fact a fairly uncontroversial position to hold. But these claims do rely on a problematic historical assumption, in that they rely on the idea of a 'classical' age in which war and peace were indeed distinguishable. That is, they assume that the destabilisation of 'war' and 'peace' is somehow new; hence the references to wars in 'the past', in the 'old sense' and in the 'classical' age. The nebulous nature of some of these phrases is remarkable, given the implied radicalism of the insight being expressed. Worse, in accepting the very claim made by the major Western powers that everything has indeed changed from the time when the distinction between war and peace was supposedly categorical and straightforward, this account also reinforces the general fetish of '9/11' as the political event of our time.
It may be that there really was a 'classical age' when the concept and condition of war was clear, but I doubt it. Felix Grob's book The Relativity of War and Peace, published in 1949, offers countless examples of states engaged in mass militarised killing of enemies but either denying or sometimes just not knowing whether or not they were at war, and more than a few international lawyers in the mid-twentieth century also pointed out the artificial nature of the distinction between war and peace. Quincy Wright, writing as a lawyer in one of the major liberal democracies, pointed out in 1932 that 'a state of war may exist without active hostilities, and active hostilities may exist without a state of war', while Carl Schmitt, writing as a lawyer in one of the major fascist regimes, claimed a few years later that 'the concept of war today has … become a problem', in that 'it is now impossible to distinguish between not only the just and unjust war, but also between "war" and "not-war"'. That is, he adds, if 'war can even be said to exist'. Georg Schwarzenberger attacked the presumption of the 'abnormal' or 'alternative' character of war in 1943, arguing that states were continually in a 'status mixtus' between peace and war, and in 1954 Philip Jessup proposed that international law recognise a status 'intermediate' between peace and war.
14 The history books and the law books are replete with comments along these lines. Thus when in 1968 leading international lawyer Elihu Lauterpacht reflected on the conflicts in Korea, Vietnam and Yemen, he could claim that in a technical-legal sense the protracted fighting in those conflicts was not war.
True, in two of these situations many of the 'laws of war' were applied, and in particular the Geneva Conventions of 1949. That fact, however, does not change the conflicts in to 'war' in the strict sense, since those Conventions contain certain provisions that they shall apply in case of hostilities as well as in case of war. In other technical respects these conflicts did not enjoy the legal status of 'war'. In particular, there was no 'declaration of war'; in the case of the one conflict which was terminated, the Korean conflict, there was no 'treaty of peace'; and in none of the three cases was there any attempt on the part of the belligerents to require states not immediately involved to adopt positions of 'neutrality'.
15
Taking a longer historical view, we find the same point being made time and again. Three examples: following naval battles between the US and the French in 1798 the official French position was that there had been no war, the US Attorney General agreed, and the Supreme Court later called it a 'limited' or 'imperfect' war; during the 1827 naval battle of Navarino, the British, French and Russian fleets attacked the TurcoEgyptian fleet, destroying some 60 ships and killing 4,000 men, but the British Foreign Secretary said they were not at war; following the declaration of support for Turkey from France and England in Turkey's war with Russia in 1853, Secretary Lord Clarendon said that 'we are not at war, because war is not declared -we are not strictly at peace with Russia … I consider that we are in the intermediate state '. 16 It is therefore fair to say that the consensus among critical theorists about a recent elision of war and peace is rooted in a deep historical misconception. Indeed, as I have shown at length elsewhere, the whole logic of 'security' underpinning bourgeois modernity is that despite being conjoined with 'peace' (in the mantra of 'peace and security') it constantly reiterates the idea that peace is a form of war.
17 So one basic point to be made and pursued in the chapters which follow is that from a critical perspective the distinction between war and peace has always been questionable. The fact that the distinction remains so dominant, however, suggests that it is still doing rather a lot of political work. One of the purposes of this book is to challenge that work, and thereby offer a critique of liberal ideology and its language of 'peace'. The more specific and political aim of this book, however, is also to use this challenge as the basis for a critique of war power.
To take up questions of war requires first and foremost recognition of the powerful sway of received ideas and dominant narratives through which we are supposed to think about it. These ideas and narrativeswhat C. Wright Mills once called the 'military definition of reality' -get repeated easily and endlessly, and ultimately constrain new and more radical ways of thinking about war. 18 More importantly, critical theorists on the Left have too easily bought into the idea of war as articulated in international relations (IR) and strategic studies and have thus been driven by an agenda not of the Left's own making, replicating a very narrow idea of war as formal military engagement between states and aping IR and strategic studies in becoming little more than a series of footnotes to Clausewitz. The problem might be seen in what is missing from the narrow conception of war. First, such a conception has traditionally designated colonial warfare as 'unconventional' or a 'small wars' affair, thereby managing to dismiss what has in fact been 'by far the most common form of warfare in the modern world'. 19 To give an example of the way this dismissal works, one need only note that between 1815 and 1914 'there was not one month in which British forces were not engaged somewhere across the world ', 20 and yet the period in question is still widely described in British history books as the 'hundred years peace'. This is because the 'engagements' were merely 'small wars'. 'Small wars', in other words, is the category used by liberal theory and mainstream war studies to describe the violence through which millions have been slaughtered and resources of whole continents appropriated; so 'small' is such warfare, in fact, that even the writing on 'total war' more or less completely omits it. The reason that such an extensive organised violence in the process of systematic colonisation can be sidelined in this way is deeply connected to the second absence in the narrow conception of war: the structural and systematic violence through which capitalist order has been constituted and accumulation secured.
All of which is to say that radical thinking about the war power must address the question of capital; conversely, it is also a way of saying that radical thinking about capital must address the question of war.
21 This book therefore aims to take discussion of the war power away from the mundane familiarity of what counts as 'war studies', its sub-fields such as military history and strategic studies, its adjacent fields such as IR and geopolitics, and its broader ideological underpinnings in liberal theory. This book instead starts at a difference place: by thinking of war as inseparable from the history of capitalist domination. This book therefore seeks to understand the war power in terms of what is, after all, the most fundamental and violent conflict in human history: the class war.
In a speech at Elberfeld in 1845, Frederick Engels commented on 'present-day society, which … produces a social war of all against all'.
22
This was a major theme of The Condition of the Working Class in England, published the same year, which describes 'the social war, the war of each against all … openly declared'. Everywhere is barbarous indifference, hard egotism and nameless misery: 'every man's house is a state of siege, everywhere reciprocal plundering under the protection of the law', meaning that 'everywhere [is] social warfare'. Such comments appear as a gloss on the perpetual war of the state of nature as described by Hobbes, but Engels points to the class dimension of this war. 'Let us proceed to a more detailed investigation of the position in which the social war has placed the non-possessing class', an investigation which takes in the miserable condition of the working class, the deaths from overwork and malnutrition, and the use of the law against any attempt on the part of the working class to resist such conditions. 'Is this social war, or is it not?' asks Engels, adding that 'it is in the interest of the bourgeoisie to conduct this war hypocritically, under the guise of peace'. 23 Marx likewise refers to 'civil war in its most terrible aspect, the war of labour against capital' 24 and in Capital writes of the struggles over the working day as a 'protracted and more or less concealed civil war between the capitalist class and the working class'. 25 As joint-authors of the Manifesto of the Communist Party, Marx and Engels also write of the 'more or less veiled civil war' that takes place in bourgeois society with the development of the proletariat.
26
Mainstream studies of war tend to assume that when Marx and Engels use the term 'war' in these ways they do so in a rhetorical sense.
27
But much as Marx and Engels do delight in more than the occasional rhetorical flourish, 28 their claims about the social war are meant to be taken seriously. Hence when in Capital Marx comments that 'force is the midwife of every old society which is pregnant with a new one', and that force 'is itself an economic power' 29 the term Marx uses is Gewalt, better understood as 'violence', and he is describing the systematic colonisation of the social world by capital and the violence which creates, re-creates and permanently disciplines the proletariat. The violence is a form of war, a global and permanent process that Marx analyses through the lens of 'primitive accumulation', as we shall see in Chapter 2.
Yet are we not constantly told that capital, trade and private property are signs of a healthy commercial order, and that a healthy commercial order is in an inherently co-constitutive relationship with peace? Is this not one of the central claims of liberalism and its law?
According to mainstream IR and political theory, liberalism sets out its stall as a politics of peace. The so-called 'liberal peace' thesis assumes that if all societies were liberal (that is, less barbaric, less communist, less totalitarian, less terroristic, less fascist) then the world would be at peace and the mythical liberal entity known as 'security' would prevail. On this view, war is something that emerges from outside of liberal society. This book will instead suggest that liberalism has from its inception been a political philosophy of war, has been fully conscious of this and, as a consequence, has sought to bury this fact under various banners: 'peace and security'; 'law and order'; 'police'. To accept the idea that there was a 'classical age' where the distinction between war and peace did make sense is thus to accept one of liberalism's major myths, one which circulates widely in academic discourse as part of 'the liberal peace' hypothesis: that peace is the focal dynamic of civil society, that capitalism and peace go hand in hand, that law and the state exist in order to realise this 'liberal peace' within civil society, and that international law exists to ensure peace between states. This series of conjoined myths has served to gloss over what Michael Dillon and Julian Reid call the 'liberal way of war'. 30 To gloss over, that is, the violence of the liberal peace and liberalism's own mechanism for producing order and policing subjects. Like its siblings 'security', 'law and order' and 'police', 'peace' is from a critical perspective politically suspicious.
'If we look beneath peace, order, wealth, and authority … will we hear and discover a sort of primitive and permanent war?' In asking this question Michel Foucault launched a project exploring the ways in which we might consider war as the matrix for techniques of domination. Noting Clausewitz's well-known formulation that war is the continuation of politics by other means, Foucault insists that we invert the formulation: politics is the continuation of war by other means. On this view, the task of political power lies in the perpetual inscription of relations of force through a form of unspoken warfare called 'civil peace'. It is not so much 'politics' that is the continuation of war by other means, then, but that 'peace' is, alterations in which are merely episodes, factions and displacements in war. We 'have to interpret the war that is going on beneath peace', because 'peace itself is a coded war'.
31
Before developing these points we might note that Foucault's comments are not quite as much of an inversion of Clausewitz as Foucault thinks. Clausewitz's thinking around the formulation that war is the continuation of politics in another form concerns the question of whether war is an art or science. For Clausewitz, war is not a science such as maths or astronomy, in which the subject is pure knowledge, and in that sense the term 'art of war' is more appropriate. Yet 'strictly speaking', he says, 'war is neither an art nor a science', but 'is part of man's social existence'. This has a number of implications. First, 'rather than comparing it [war] to art we could more accurately compare it to commerce, which is also a conflict of human interests and activities'. Second, war 'is still closer to politics, which in turn may be considered as a kind of commerce on a larger scale', and which means that 'the main lines along which military events progress, and to which they are restricted, are political lines that continue throughout the war into the subsequent peace'; 'how could it be otherwise?', Clausewitz adds, as if he thought he was stating the obvious.
32 Third, if war is indeed a continuation of politics by other means then the 'politics' Clausewitz has in mind is one which takes war to be as one of the highest forms of experience, with an existential vitality, as his 1812 'Political Declaration' and his private letters make clear. 33 These issues aside (and to underscore the point just made about footnotes to Clausewitz, this is the last time he will be mentioned in this book) if it is indeed the case that the political lines of war continue into the subsequent peace, and peace itself is a coded war, then 'keeping the peace' has to be understood anew, and it has to be understood anew through the concept which has historically been central to it as an idea: police.
In 2006 34 Such blurring is now central to military planning. 35 Thus when state personnel use phrases such as 'more of an operation, not a war' they almost always suggest that the operation in question looks and feels like something called 'police'. 'Police' has thus become a central feature of the discursive trope through which the war power is now simultaneously invoked and elided.
This contemporary connection between the war power and the police power reinforces, though is in turn also reinforced by, the increasing use of rather loose concepts within academia and journalism, such as 'world policeman', 'world sheriff', 'global gendarme', 'globocop', 'policekeeping', 'soldiers as cops', 'the blue in the green' and 'blue geopolitics'. Such terminology is found far and wide across the political spectrum.
36
It is also found far and wide across the disciplines: international relations, international law, criminology, socio-legal studies, and social and political theory all have a story to tell about 'criminology meeting international relations', the coming together of the 'military model' and the 'criminological model', of 'war-fighting' turning into 'crime-fighting', and 'warfare' converging with 'crimefare'. 37 The problem with much of the work in this field, however, is that it has an incredibly impoverished concept of police power. All that seems to happen in this work is that IR scholars give a nod in the direction of criminology, and criminologists send a little wink in the direction of IR, and both doff their caps to political theories of war, but all that emerges is a series of rather dull claims about the 'militarisation of policing' and the 'policization of the military' or the coming together of 'high-intensity policing' with 'lowintensity warfare'. For a critical theory of war power, police power and capital accumulation, these banalities get us precisely nowhere.
This can perhaps best be seen in the work of the critical thinkers already cited who suggest that war and peace are coming together, for the almost universal assumption they make is that one can see war and peace coming together in the way war now looks like police. According to Badiou, governments now oppose terrorism within the symbolic register of 'policing'; according to Agamben, 'a particularly destructive jus belli … cloak[s] itself in a seemingly modest "police operation"'; according to Paul Virilio, 'the military class is turning into an internal super-police'. The most influential work, however, has been that of Hardt and Negri. In Empire Hardt and Negri suggest that 'war is reduced to the status of police action', with the US acting as the 'international police power'. 'Today the enemy, just like war itself, comes to be banalized', and by 'banalized' they mean 'reduced to the status of routine police repression'. Lest we be unclear about their meaning, they repeat the point four years later in Multitude, where they tell us again that war is 'reduced to police action ' . 38 Yet what is this 'reduction' exactly? We are told neither why the process needs to be understood as 'reduction' nor what 'reduction' means, in any real sense. What appears in these debates, then, is a rather basic, narrow and ultimately very liberal concept of police. It is the concept of police found in 'police studies'.
Police studies is centrally concerned with something called 'the police', an institution it claims was invented in the early nineteenth century to deal with crime and enforce the law. But as I have argued at length elsewhere, this was a meaning imposed on the term 'police' by an increasingly hegemonic liberalism in the late-eighteenth century. There is, however, a much older and broader conception of police, the central concern of which was 'good order' in the broadest possible sense, including crime and law enforcement but extending through the regulation of trade and commerce, the discipline of labour, the process of education and training, welfare and health, the minutia of social life and, of course, anything understood as breaching the 'peace'. In some of my earlier work I sought to recover this older and broader concept of police from the backwater of 'police studies' and to place it at the heart of a critical theory of state power. The point was to suggest that 'police' has to be understood less in terms of the institution called the police and more in terms of the broad range of powers through which social order is fabricated and subjects constituted -the police power -exercised by a range of agencies of policing situated throughout the state and the institutions for administering civil society.
39 This is the search for the 'well-ordered police state', 40 one which takes in the maintenance of the body politic as a whole 41 and offers an overarching principle for creating a social body out of individual subject-citizens best captured in the Latin phrase used by Foucault when grappling with the idea of police: omnes et singulatim (everyone together and each individually). 42 More than anything, however, this is a concept of police 'as a bundle of measures that make work possible and necessary to all those who could not live without it'.
43
The police power thus involves a set of apparatuses and technologies constituting political order in general and the law of labour in particular. This gives us an expanded concept of police that enables us to make sense of the fabrication of bourgeois order and is the very reason why that concept so central to police, namely security, is the fundamental concept of bourgeois society. 46 In further lectures Foucault develops this focus to consider politics as the continuation of war by other means. This approach to thinking politics through war and thinking war politically is reinforced in Foucault's more substantive works such as The History of Sexuality, but most notably in Discipline and Punish where he takes as his model a perpetual battle rather than contract and which uses war (and not punishment, despite the book's familiar motifs) for understanding power.
One can therefore read Foucault as sometimes thinking about power through the lens of police and sometimes through the lens of war. Yet there is something fundamentally strange about Foucault's work in this regard, in that these really do seem to be two different lenses. In other words, he never really does very much to connect his concepts of police and war, such as offering an exploration of how these two apparatuses might be considered together, within each other, alongside each other or implicated in one another. In 'Society Must Be Defended', for example, he talks at some length about war yet gives just a couple of passing and somewhat superfluous references to police. In the lectures two years later, published as Security, Territory, Population, he talks about both police and war and yet for the most part discusses them separately. He speaks of 'two great assemblages': 'a military-diplomatic apparatus, on the one hand, and the apparatus of police … on the other'. And although he suggests that there is a relation between police and 'European equilibrium' maintained by the military-diplomatic assemblage and that these two apparatuses had to 'maintain a relation of forces, and then the growth of these forces' in a way which links them under the sign of 'security', he for the most part keeps them apart, even going so far at one point to characterise the Italian state as a state of military-diplomacy but not police.
47
There is I think a potential in Foucault's work which is never quite realised, namely to consider the war power and the police power in conjunction. 48 That it remains unrealised is witnessed by two features of the scholarship in this field. On the one hand, there is now a substantial and important body of work stemming from an engagement with Foucault which has sought to mobilise the original concept of police for new insights in political and historical sociology. 49 However, aside from maybe three short attempts, 50 it has not been widely used to grapple with the international dimension of police powers or what it means to speak of war and police coming together. On the other hand, there is now a growing body of work within IR and geopolitics which has sought to bring Foucault's work to bear on questions of war and international order. Yet virtually none of this work utilises Foucault's account of the police power. 51 More often than not, 'police' just never appears. Worse, when it does appear it is as the police -in the narrow, liberal and decidedly non-Foucauldian conception of mainstream police studies. Despite employing Foucault, this work has more or less completely forgone any attempt to use the broader and far more productive concept of police, and thus all of the critical potential in exploring the war-police nexus is lost.
In other words, the 'war-is-becoming-police' approach found across the disciplines and in the various attempts to think critically about war does little genuinely to bring 'war' and 'police' together and sheds little light on either; more or less replicating the liberal conception of police, it comes closer to mystifying rather than explaining. Critical theory needs an argument that works on and with the nexus of war power and police power. This is an argument that assumes that war and police are always already together, that treats the war power and the police power as predicative on one another. This is therefore not a book about an institution called 'the military' and how it connects to an institution called 'the police'. From a critical perspective, such a distinction is irrelevant, pandering as it does to a general liberal tendency replicated throughout the social and political sciences, namely the simplifying of the complexity of state power into distinct dichotomies: law versus administration, constitutional versus exceptional, normal versus emergency, courts versus tribunals, legislative versus executive, state versus civil society and, of course, military versus police. Rather, we need to think of war and police as processes working in conjunction as state power.
By thinking through the war power in conjunction with the police power, and the police power as dealing with a condition of disorder, the war power can more easily be read in terms of the fabrication of order. This is an analysis of the way war imbricates itself into the fabric of social relations as a form of ordering the world, diffracting into a series of micro-operations and regulatory practices to ensure those nebulous targets of bourgeois desire: security, order and accumulation.
Mitchell Dean has argued that in the terms of the original police science we can see some important differences between police and war: police confronts a situation of disorder rather than an enemy; when police does concern an enemy, it is as a source of disorder rather than as an enemy per se. In this light, the main concern of police is the constitution of order rather than defeating the enemy. 52 True as this is, it obscures a double unifying connection between the police power and war power in this regard, a connection which will run through this book. On the one hand, we need to grasp the exercise of the police power in constant war against the 'enemies of order'. Police treatises, texts, speech and action never cease telling us of the constant police wars being fought against the disorderly, unruly, criminal, indecent, disobedient, disloyal and lawless. 53 On the other hand, we also need to grasp the ordering capabilities of the war power. 'War is the motor behind institution and order', as Foucault puts it. 54 Just as the police power is not reducible to the police but depends on a whole range of technologies to form the social order, so the war power is not reducible to the military but depends on a whole range of technologies to do the same. 55 If, as it has been said, warfare can best be defined with one word -formation 56 -then we might say that what is always under formation is order: social order, international order, the order of accumulation.
57 This is therefore a book about technologies of war power and police power in the formation of capitalist order; it is therefore also a book about the violence of accumulation and its legitimisation in liberal ideology. The fabrication of bourgeois order is war. This is, however, not a book about the 'war on terror'. Although I do discuss the 'war on terror' at various points and use some of its features as a springboard for my wider argument -we live, after all, in a time in which liberals seem to be falling over each other in the rush to explain why the war machine must keep rolling on and on -it is now fairly obvious that the 'war on terror' has little to do with defeating 'terror', whatever that might mean, and rather a lot to do with shaping civil society and the social order: with making and remaking citizens and/as subjects, with re-forming populations into new modes of security and technologies of governing and, more than anything, with establishing new grounds for accumulation. The war on terror is thus treated as the contemporary instantiation of the combination of war power and police power.
It will be clear from this Introduction that this book seeks to distance the reader from the familiarity of the disciplines in which war and police are 'obviously' studied. Obviousness more often than not reveals itself as a function of power, 58 a means of policing the act of writing, and nowhere is this clearer than in what passes as 'war studies', 'police studies', IR and criminology. This book therefore seeks to break with the obvious, or at least what is presented as obvious in the disciplinary formations of the modern University. The value of a thought really needs to be measured by its distance from the obvious and the familiar. 59 Or as Flaubert once said, 'the worth of a book can be judged by the strength of the punches it gives and the length of time it takes you to recover from them'.
